Holding the  Responsible Corporate Officer  Responsible: Addressing the Need For Expansion of Criminal Liability For Corporate Environmental Violators by Mullikin, Nancy
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal
Volume 3
Issue 2 Pacific Region Edition Article 5
October 2001
Holding the "Responsible Corporate Officer"
Responsible: Addressing the Need For Expansion
of Criminal Liability For Corporate Environmental
Violators
Nancy Mullikin
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the
Environmental Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact jfischer@ggu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nancy Mullikin, Holding the "Responsible Corporate Officer" Responsible: Addressing the Need For Expansion of Criminal Liability For
Corporate Environmental Violators, 3 Golden Gate U. Envtl. L.J. (2001).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol3/iss2/5




HOLDING THE ―RESPONSIBLE 
CORPORATE OFFICER‖ RESPONSIBLE: 
ADDRESSING THE NEED FOR 
EXPANSION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY 
FOR CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL 
VIOLATORS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
As custodians of the planet, we are bound by a duty to protect the 
environment for all living creatures. Ensuring ecosystems function 
harmoniously is of utmost importance in order to sustain the health of the 
Earth and all living organisms residing on and in its fertile soils and rich 
waters. Since the expansion of business during the Industrial Revolution, 
companies of all sizes have been impacting our environment, leaving 
cumulative footprints of destruction in their paths.
1
  This impact has been 







 See Encyclopædia Britanica Online, Industrial Revolution, www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/287086/Industrial-Revolution (last visited Jan. 21, 2010). The Industrial 
Revolution began in Europe in the eighteenth century, and was characterized by ―unprecedented 
economic development‖ and a ―general expansion of commercial activity.‖ Id.; see also N. Brian 
Winchester, Emerging Global Environmental Governance, 16 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 7, 8 (2009) 
(―The Industrial Revolution was similarly characterized by contaminated water, poisonous air, and 




 See, e.g., Species Disappearing at an Alarming Rate, Report Says, MSNBC.COM, Nov. 17, 
2004, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6502368/ (reporting that the ―world‘s biodiversity is declining at an 
unprecedented rate . . . [with] [h]abitat destruction and degradation [being] the leading threats.‖); see 
also U.S. EPA, Climate Change – Greenhouse Gas Emissions, www.epa.gov/climatechange/ 
1
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Criminal prosecution of environmental crimes has played a key role 
in enforcing compulsory regulations that govern the corporate private 
sector.
3
 Criminal sanctions in the corporate arena are essential to deter 
and remediate environmental crimes and ensure protection of the public.
4
 
Imposing civil liability on a corporation is insufficient, as the true 
violators may hide behind the corporation and avoid personal liability.
5
 
Through litigation, a doctrine has been developed that is used to expand 
criminal liability beyond the corporation to include ―responsible 
corporate officers.‖
6
 Subsequently, this doctrine has been written into 
various environmental statutes,
7
 but application of this doctrine has been 
met with varying resistance because of its ability to ―pierce the corporate 
veil.‖
8




emissions/co2.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2010) ―Since the Industrial Revolution in the 1700‘s, human 
activities, such as the burning of oil, coal and gas, and deforestation, have increased CO2 
concentrations in the atmosphere. In 2005, global atmospheric concentrations of CO2 were 35% 
higher than they were before the Industrial Revolution.‖). 
 
3
 See Eva M. Fromm, Commanding Respect: Criminal Sanctions for Environmental Crimes, 
21 ST. MARY‘S L.J. 821, 822 (1990) (―[Government] agencies now feel that the mere imposition of 
fines is largely ineffective; thus resulting in the onset of criminal sanctions. The threat of possible 
incarceration for violations of environmental statutes has terrorized many environmental managers 
and commanded their previously unattainable respect.‖). 
 
4
 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Environmental Crime at the Crossroads: The Intersection of 
Environmental and Criminal Law Theory, 71 TUL. L. REV. 487, 506 (1996-97) (noting that 
criminalization of environmental violations is rooted in the core concepts of criminal law, including 
deterrence, harm, and culpability); see also Ethan H. Jessup, Environmental Crimes and Corporate 
Liability: The Evolution of the Prosecution of “Green” Crimes by Corporate Entities, 33 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 721, 730 (1999) (―One of the main purposes and policies behind any criminal prosecution is 
deterring criminals and would-be criminals from committing crimes.‖). 
 
5
 See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, corporate veil (8th ed. 2004) (―The legal assumption that 
the acts of a corporation are not the actions of its shareholders, so that the shareholders are exempt 
from liability for the corporation‘s actions.‖). 
 
6
 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 
(1975); see also Randy J. Sutton, Annotation, “Responsible Corporate Officer” Doctrine or 
“Responsible Relationship” of Corporate Officer to Corporate Violation of Law , 119 A.L.R. 5th 
205 (2004) (discussing case application of the responsible corporate officer doctrine, or on the basis 
of a determination that there was a ―responsible relationship‖ of a corporate officer to a corporate 
violation of law, or a ―responsible share‖ in such a violation, as derived from the doctrine first 
enunciated in Dotterweich, and later in Park). 
 
7
 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(6)(Westlaw 2010) (―For the purpose of this subsection, the 
term ‗person‘ means, in addition to the definition contained in section 1362(5) of this title, any 
responsible corporate officer.‖); 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6)(Westlaw 2010) (―For the purpose of this 
subsection, the term ‗person‘ includes, in addition to the entities referred to in section 7602(e) of this 
title, any responsible corporate officer.‖). 
 
8
 See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Mens Rea and the Cost of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415, 446 
(2007). (―[The Dotterweich and Park] decisions are credited with introducing the so-called 
‗responsible corporate officer‘ (‗RCO‘) doctrine, which continues to generate substantial confusion 
and uncertainty concerning the extent to which corporate officers are strictly liable for corporate 
misconduct.‖); Jeremy D. Heep, Adapting the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine in Light of 
2
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Congress specifically added ―responsible corporate officers‖ to the 
list of those criminally liable under the Clean Water Act (CWA)
10
 and 
the Clean Air Act (CAA).
11
 This comment argues that the responsible 
corporate officer (RCO) doctrine, as written into the CWA and the CAA, 
was intended to impose an affirmative duty on corporate officers based 
on their position and should be interpreted to expand criminal liability in 
the prosecution of substantive corporate environmental crimes. 
This comment also argues that the courts should expand criminal 
liability based on the RCO doctrine instead of limiting its application. 
Part II provides an overview of criminal prosecution of environmental 
crimes: its history, procedures, and purposes, in order to provide a 
context for understanding how the RCO doctrine appropriately expands 
criminal liability. Part III outlines the development of the RCO doctrine 
by the Supreme Court and its addition to the CWA and the CAA. 
Although the RCO doctrine has been expanded to impose civil liability, 
this comment focuses on its application to impose criminal liability only. 
Part IV shows how some of the early judicial applications of the RCO 
doctrine left it open for later courts to use the doctrine to expand criminal 
liability of corporate officers. The clearest example of this argument for 
expansion was articulated by the Tenth Circuit in United States v. 
Brittain.
12
 At the same time as Brittain, other circuits chose to limit 
liability instead of expanding it; these contemporaneous decisions are 
discussed in Part V. Part VI shows how subsequent courts chose to 
affirm the limited interpretation rather than Brittain’s expanded one. 
Lastly, Part VII examines other legal doctrines that extend criminal 
liability. This comment concludes by arguing that the effectiveness of 
environmental laws would be maximized by the application of the RCO 
doctrine to expand criminal liability. 
 
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 78 MINN. L. REV. 699, 700 (1994) (noting 
that ―the scope and breadth of the [responsible corporate officer] doctrine remains ambiguous‖). 
 
9
 See, e.g., United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 
1991) (finding that proof that the defendant was a responsible corporate officer was insufficient to 
show required knowledge for conviction under RCRA); United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 
(E.D. Wash. 1991) (rejecting the proposition that a corporate officer may be held criminally liable 
for RCRA violations based solely on the officer‘s responsible position.); United States v. Iverson, 
162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the doctrine relieves the government only of having to 
prove that defendant personally discharged or caused the discharge of a pollutant; the government 




 See 33 U.S.C.A.§ 1319(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
11
 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
12
 United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991). 
3
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II. CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 
There are two broad categories of offenses that can result in 
criminal prosecution of environmental crimes. The first category is 
covered under Title 18 of the United States Code, which punishes 
conspiracies, the making of false statements, mail and wire fraud, and 
other similar crimes.
13
 These types of crimes are outside the scope of this 
comment. The second category involves acts made punishable 
specifically under the various environmental statutes enacted since 1970 
such as the CWA and the CAA,
14
 which will be the focus of this 
comment. 
A. HISTORY OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 
Federal environmental laws that incorporate criminal sanctions can 
be traced back over one hundred years to the Rivers and Harbors Act 
(RHA) of 1899.
15
 The RHA formed the basis for the CWA, which was 
designed to ―restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological 
integrity of the Nation‘s waters.‖
16
 Under the CWA, violators were 
originally subject mostly to civil and administrative penalties.
17
 
However, during the 1980‘s the federal government increased the 
penalties to include criminal enforcement.
18
 To support this increase, the 
Department of Justice‘s (DOJ) Lands Division was reorganized to form 
the Environmental Enforcement Section.
19
 The publicly stated goal of 
this reorganization was to focus on ―egregious violations‖ and 
―deliberate or recalcitrant violations‖ to enhance criminal enforcement of 
environmental crimes.
20
 In January 1981 the Environmental Protection 







 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
14








 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
17
 See Susan Hedman, Expressive Functions of Criminal Sanctions in Environmental Law, 59 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 889, 893-94 (1991). 
 
18
 See id. at 894 (discussing the increase in penalties from civil to include criminal as a 
reflection of society‘s changing opinion as to the violation of environmental regulations). 
 
19
 See Judson W. Starr, Turbulent Times at Justice and EPA: The Origins of Environmental 
Criminal Prosecutions and the Work that Remains, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 900, 904 (1990). 
 
20
 See id. at 904 (discussing DOJ‘s attempt to shift to a new enforcement approach). 
 
21
 See id. at 907. 
4
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In November 1982 the DOJ established the Environmental Crimes 
Unit (ECU) to manage the criminal cases being filed by the EPA.
22
 ―The 
creation of ECU served to provide DOJ with a team of prosecutors who 
could concentrate exclusively on environmental criminal cases while 
informing the public of DOJ‘s commitment to criminal prosecution of 
environmental crimes.‖
23
 The ECU was very successful, filing forty 
cases in the first year and achieving forty convictions.
24
 
During this time period, Congress was increasing the complexity of 
the regulatory regime and raising many violations from misdemeanors to 
felonies.
25
 This increased enforcement was especially necessary in the 
corporate arena. The theory was, and still is, that without criminal 
sanctions that can include heavy fines and the occasional imprisonment 
of corporate officers, corporations would continue to treat environmental 
violations as a ―cost of doing business.‖
26
 
B. PROSECUTION OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 
The criminal enforcement of environmental crimes begins at the 
EPA and flows through to the DOJ.
27
 Administrators at the EPA are 
authorized to respond to violations through administrative or civil 
sanctions.
28




 See JUDSON W. STARR & YVETTE D. WILLIAMS, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES IN 






 See Memorandum from Peggy Hutchins, paralegal, to Ronald A. Sarachan, then-
Environmental Crimes Section Chief, Department of Justice (Apr. 7, 1995), reproduced in JOHN F. 
COONEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES DESKBOOK 87 
(1996), available at http://books.google.com/books?id=-fWD7LptUiwC&lpg=PP1&dq= 
environmental%20crimes%20deskbook&pg=PP1#v=onepage&q=&f=false; see also Starr & 
Williams, supra note 22, at 5. 
 
25
 See Richard J. Lazarus, Meeting the Demands of Integration in the Evolution of 
Environmental Law: Reforming Environmental Criminal Law, 83 GEO. L.J. 2407, 2446-47 (1995) 
(discussing how Congress significantly enhanced the penalties applicable to existing environmental 
criminal provisions, upgrading many violations from misdemeanors to felonies). 
 
26
 See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of 
Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 917, 922 (2001) (discussing the idea 
that if polluters are rational, the availability of criminal penalties is crucial to deterrence because 
sometimes the economic benefit of noncompliance will exceed the maximum allowable civil penalty 
under the statute); see also Paul Thomson, A New Cost of Business for Environmental Violators, 
ENVTL. FORUM, May-June 1990, at 32 (―Jail time is one cost of doing business that cannot be passed 
along to the consumer.‖); see also E. Dennis Muchnicki, Only Criminal Sanctions Can Ensure 
Public Safety, ENVTL. FORUM, May-June 1990, at 31 (arguing that ―fines become merely a cost of 
doing business,‖ and that only the threat of jail can deter some environmental crime). 
 
27




 See id. 
5
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to the DOJ.
29
 At the DOJ, the prosecutors have discretion in deciding 
whether to file charges for a violation and what sanctions should be 
sought.
30
 Further, both EPA and DOJ can exercise their discretion not to 
file charges for violations altogether.
31
 This includes discretion to decide 
―(1) which crimes to prosecute and against which groups or individuals; 
(2) when to investigate; (3) whether to charge; (4) whether to divert the 
potential defendant from the criminal system to civil proceedings; and 
(5) whether to plea bargain or dismiss charges.‖
32
 
Critics of environmental prosecutions feel that prosecutorial 
discretion creates problems with the fairness and predictability of 
environmental criminal enforcement.
33
 One commentator argued that 
prosecutorial discretion ―often results in an ―eeny meeny miny mo‖ 
element of prosecutorial choice in the environmental crimes arena and 
imposes an almost arbitrary randomness and the appearance of 
unfairness.‖
34
 The concern is that prosecutorial discretion could be used 
as a means of ―widening the net‖ of criminal- enforcement efforts 
beyond that intended by congressional statutes.
35
 But, like other branches 
of statutory law, much of federal criminal law is flawed by imperfect 
draftsmanship.
36
 This creates the need for flexibility, which is exactly 
what prosecutorial discretion does to ensure appropriate enforcement 
decisions. In fact, it is a necessary method for screening cases and 
limiting the number of cases that are actually prosecuted to those that 






 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(a)(3)(D) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
30
 See Krug, supra note 27, at 645. 
 
31
 See JOHN F. COONEY ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMES 




 Theodora Galacatos, The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes 
Section: A Case Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict over Congressional Oversight and the 
Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 587, 599 (1995). 
 
33
 See Kathleen F. Brickey, The Rhetoric of Environmental Crime: Culpability, Discretion, 
and Structural Reform, 84 IOWA L. REV. 115, 116 (1998). 
 
34
 Milo C. Mason & Paul B. Smyth, Reviewing Nonreviewable Prosecutorial Discretion: 
What and Who is Behind the Big, Powerful Curtain, 23 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV‘T 7, 31-32 (2009). 
 
35
 Brickey, supra note 33, at 129. 
 
36
 Robert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the Federal System: An Empirical Study of 
Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV., 1036, 1073 (1972) (criminal statutes tend to be written 
at ―a level of generality that would make literal enforcement unjust‖). 
 
37
 See Brickey, supra note 33, at 129. 
6
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C. PURPOSES OF THE CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAWS 
Criminal prosecution of environmental crimes is the appropriate 
response to environmental violations, especially in the corporate context. 
Criminal prosecution offers a wide range of advantages that traditional 
civil sanctions do not, such as deterrence, remediation, and increased 
public safety.
38
 Deterrence is essential to the effectiveness of 
environmental enforcement because many of the effects of 
environmental crimes are irreversible.
39
 Criminal prosecution is also 
fitting for environmental violations because the remediation process 
offered by criminal sanctions is more effective in its timeliness.
40
 
Further, for reasons of public safety, criminal prosecution is a necessary 





 One of the main purposes of criminal prosecution is to deter 
potential violators from committing crimes. In fact, criminal sanctions 
are considered the most effective means of deterrence available because 
of the power criminal courts have to impose severe penalties, such as jail 
time.
42
 Because of the potential for businesses to write off the civil 
penalties imposed for violations of environmental regulations as a cost of 
doing business, the use of criminal sanctions for violations of 
environmental laws reflects society‘s unwillingness to tolerate 
environmental mistreatment. It also reflects society‘s desire to make sure 
that businesses do not just pass on the civil costs of violations to the 
consuming public.
43
 In addition to preventing businesses from taking this 
view, the threat of criminal sanctions creates a strong personal incentive 




 See Jessup, supra note 4, at 730. 
 
39
 See Brickey, supra note 4, at 507 (discussing common traits of environmental crime and 
traditional crime, noting that ―[e]nvironmental crimes have the potential to cause catastrophic harm 
to the environment, public health, and local economies and ways of life‖). 
 
40
 See Jessup, supra note 4, at 731. 
 
41




 See Brickey, supra note 4, at 506 (describing the ―social group‖ that corporate officials 




 See Jessup, supra note 4, at 730; see also Martin E. Levin, The Massachusetts 
Environmental Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994). 
7
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punishments.
44
 Normally corporate officers and employees are shielded 
from personal liability by the corporate entity.
45
 Therefore, criminal 
sanctions are an effective means of deterrence because in criminal law, 




Environmental crimes can create problems that require expedited 
remediation in order to limit the extent of the harm.
47
 Criminal 
prosecutions often move more quickly than civil and administrative 
actions and are therefore a more effective means of remediation.
48
 This is 
important in situations where a quick response to environmental crimes 
is needed, whether it is clean-up or the prevention of future violations. 
Another important aspect of remediation is society‘s need for vindication 
through the punishment of a violator.
49
 Criminal prosecution of 
environmental crimes is necessary to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for environmental laws, and to provide just 
punishment for the offense.
50
 
iii. Public Safety 
Protection of the public follows along the same lines as deterrence 
and remediation. Criminal sanctions, such as incarceration, are critical in 
protecting the public from further crimes of the defendant.
51




 See Brickey, supra note 4, at 506; see also Martin E. Levin, The Massachusetts 
Environmental Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994) (―Imposition of personal 
criminal liability on corporate officers and employees . . . is seen as one way of ensuring that 
businesses will take their environmental obligations seriously.‖). 
 
45
 See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, corporate veil (8th ed. 2004) (―The legal assumption that 
the acts of a corporation are not the actions of its shareholders, so that the shareholders are exempt 
from liability for the corporation‘s actions‖); see also 18 AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 48 (2009). 
 
46
 See Brickey, supra note 4, at 506. 
 
47
 See Jessup, supra note 4, at 731 (―The need to expedite remediation of an environmental 
problem is an important consideration, as the protection of human health and the environment is a 
central goal of criminal environmental enforcement.‖); see also Levin, supra note 44, at 51. 
 
48
 See Jessup, supra note 4, at 731 (―The ‗criminal justice system frequently moves more 
quickly than civil litigation or even administrative action.‘‖) (quoting Martin E. Levin, The 
Massachusetts Environmental Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994)). 
 
49
 See Jessup, supra note 4, at 730-31 (―[W]here the environmental violation results in such 
harm to an individual, the public or the environment that society demands punishment, the case 
likely will be prosecuted criminally.‖) (quoting Martin E. Levin, The Massachusetts Environmental 
Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994)). 
 
50
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (Westlaw 2010) (listing seriousness of the offense, respect 
for environmental laws, and just punishment as factors to be considered in imposing a sentence). 
 
51
 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (Westlaw 2010) (listing the need to protect public from 
8
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public‘s heath and safety as a central concern for many public agencies, 
any threat to safety creates a strong incentive for prosecuting 
environmental crimes.
52
 ―Where . . . conduct . . . has been particularly 
egregious or repetitive, showing a total disregard for public health and 




III. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER (RCO) DOCTRINE 
The RCO doctrine has been discussed in United States Supreme 
Court cases as well as written into multiple environmental-law statutes. 
A. UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT CASES 
The RCO doctrine was originally articulated by the United States 
Supreme Court in United States v. Dotterweich in 1943.
54
 The RCO 
doctrine was revisited and affirmed by the United States Supreme Court 
in United States v. Park in 1975.
55
 The RCO doctrine was also addressed 
in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. a few years 
prior to United States v. Park.
56
 
i. United States v. Dotterweich 
The RCO doctrine is considered to have originated in United States 
v. Dotterweich.
57
 Dotterweich, the president of Buffalo Pharmacal, Inc., 
was convicted for adulterated or misbranded food under the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) when the company purchased, 
repacked under its own label (misbranded), and shipped drugs in 
interstate commerce, which is a violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(a).
58
 At 
the same time that Dotterweich was found guilty, the company of which 
Dotterweich was the president was found not guilty.
59
 The FDCA 
prohibited ―the introduction or delivery for introduction into interstate 
 
further violations as a factor to be considered in imposing a sentence). 
 
52
 See Jessup, supra note 4, at 731. 
 
53
 Jessup, supra note 4, at 731 (quoting Martin E. Levin, The Massachusetts Environmental 
Strike Force, in 5 THE BEST OF MCLE 47, 51 (1994)). 
 
54
 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
 
55
 See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
 
56
 See United States v. Int‘l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
 
57
 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
 
58
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commerce of any . . . drug . . . that is adulterated or misbranded.‖
60
 
Further, the Act provided that ―any person‖ violating this provision was 
guilty of a misdemeanor.
61
 Dotterweich appealed the conviction by 
claiming that since the company had already been charged, he could not 
also be charged for the same crime.
62
 The Supreme Court held that ―[t]he 
offense is committed, unless the enterprise which they are serving enjoys 
the immunity of a guaranty, by all who do have such a responsible share 
in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws . . . .‖
63
 
This reasoning created the original foundation for the RCO doctrine, 
which alleviated the need to prove independent criminal liability of a 
corporate officer. Under the reasoning of the RCO doctrine, a corporate 
officer could now share criminal liability based upon his or her position 




The Supreme Court justified holding an RCO liable for the crime of 
the corporation.
65
 The Court stated, ―Congress has preferred to place 
[criminal liability] upon those who have at least the opportunity of 
informing themselves of the existence of conditions imposed for the 
protection of consumers before sharing in illicit commerce, rather than to 
throw the hazard on the innocent public who are wholly helpless.‖
66
 The 
Supreme Court‘s reasoning in Dotterweich follows the rationale of 
imposing criminal liability on RCOs based on their positions. 
ii. United States v. Park 
Almost thirty years after Dotterweich, the Supreme Court decided 
United States v. Park
67
 and reaffirmed the Court‘s decision to apply 




 21 U.S.C.A. § 331(a) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
61
 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 333(a). 
 
62
 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281 (stating that, ―individuals are immune when the ‗person‘ 
who violates s 301(a) is a corporation . . . .‖). 
 
63
 Id. at 284; see also Cynthia H. Finn, The Responsible Corporate Officer, Criminal 
Liability, and Mens Rea: Limitations on the RCO Doctrine, 46 AM. U. L. REV. 543, 551 (1996). 
 
64
 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285 (refusing to define what class of employees would stand in 
responsible relation or who had a responsible share, but rather leaving it to the ―good sense of 
prosecutors, the wise guidance of trial judges, and the ultimate judgment of juries‖). 
 
65
 See id. at 281 (stating that ―in the interest of the larger good, it puts the burden of acting at 
hazard upon a person otherwise innocent, but standing in responsible relation to a public danger‖); 




 Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 285; see also Finn, supra note 63, at 551. 
 
67
 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975). 
10
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saying: ―[t]he [Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic] Act is of a now 
familiar type which dispenses with the conventional requirement for 
criminal conduct—, awareness of some wrongdoing.‖
68
 The Court went 
on to say that ―the Act imposes not only a positive duty to seek out and 
remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to 
implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur.‖
69
 The 
Supreme Court validated the FDCA‘s decision to extend the imposition 
of liability to corporate officers. In fact, the Court further stated that ―the 
requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate 
agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps onerous, but they 
are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who 
voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises . . . .‖
70
 
The Supreme Court stands behind the imposition of criminal liability 
based on a corporate officer‘s position. 
Unfortunately, the policy of holding corporate officers criminally 
liable based on their position was created and affirmed by the Supreme 
Court in cases involving violations of the FDCA,
71





 Therefore, Dotterweich and Park dealt with 
violations that would be considered strict liability crimes.
74
 The courts 
have been hesitant to extend criminal liability in the context of statutes 
with a mens rea element because the original application of the RCO 
doctrine did not require proving mens rea.
75
 This has led to uncertainty 
and mixed results as to the use of RCO liability to secure a conviction in 
later court decisions. 
iii. United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. 
The Supreme Court opened the door for an expanded use of the 
RCO doctrine in United States v. International Minerals & Chemical 
Corp.
76








 Id. at 672; see also Hansen, supra note 65, at 1000. 
 
70
 Park, 421 U.S. at 672. 
 
71
 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); see also Park, 421 U.S. 658. 
 
72
 See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, mens rea (8th ed. 2004) (―The state of mind that the 
prosecution, to secure a conviction, must prove that a defendant had when committing a crime; 
criminal intent or recklessness.‖). 
 
73
 See 21 U.S.C.A. § 333 (Westlaw 2010); see also Finn, supra note 63, at 551. 
 
74
 See Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
 
75
 See Parts V and VI below, discussing how later courts refused to extend liability without 
proof of actual knowledge in environmental crimes that have a mens rea requirement. 
 
76
 United States v. Int‘l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558 (1971). 
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defendant with violating ICC regulations, the Supreme Court determined 
the word ―knowingly‖ applied only to knowledge of the facts, not 
knowledge of the applicable regulation or a violation of the regulation.
77
 
In this case, the defendant was charged with shipping sulfuric and 
hydrofluosilicic acids in interstate commerce and knowingly failing to 
indicate on the requisite papers that they were corrosive liquids, in 
violation of regulations.
78
 The Court opined that when dangerous 
products are involved, ―the probability of regulation is so great that 
anyone who is aware that he is in possession of them or dealing with 
them must be presumed to be aware of the regulation.‖
79
 The Court 
justified its holding reasoning by referencing the principle of criminal 
law that, ―ignorance of the law is no excuse.‖
80
 The Supreme Court thus 
reiterated its conclusion that it is proper to impose criminal liability upon 
those in a responsible position to ensure compliance with the law. 
B. STATUTORY HISTORY 
The CAA and the CWA both include language holding ―responsible 
corporate officers‖ individually liable.
81
 This comment argues that this 
addition to the Acts reflects a congressional intent to impose criminal 
liability on those persons who hold responsible positions in corporate 
violations. 
i. The CAA 
In 1955, Congress enacted the Air Pollution Control Act as the first 
federal statute dealing with air quality and air pollution, providing funds 
for research.
82
 The Clean Air Act of 1970 was the first federal legislation 
regarding air pollution control, authorizing the development of 
comprehensive federal and state regulations limiting emissions.
83
 Later 
amendments increased regulation; under Section 113(c) of the 1977 




 See id. at 563-64; see also, Hansen, supra note 65, at 1008. 
 
78
 Int’l Minerals, 402 U.S. at 559. 
 
79
 Id. at 565. 
 
80
 Id.; see also Barbara DiTata, Proof of Knowledge Under RCRA and Use of the Responsible 
Corporate Officer Doctrine, 7 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 795, 805 (1996) (describing the theory of Int’l 
Minerals as imposing a ―presumption of awareness of regulation‖). 
 
81
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either fines, confinement, or both, when specific sections of the CAA 
were knowingly violated.
84
  Thus, under the 1977 CAA, criminal liability 
could be imposed under subsection 113(c)(1) for just having knowledge 
of the violations.
85
 The 1990 CAA Amendments increased the criminal- 
enforcement options of environmental laws. The criminal-enforcement 
provisions of the amended CAA are still contained in Section 113(c), 
which now mandates a fine, or imprisonment for up to five years, or 
both.
86
 Under subsection (c)(1) criminal liability may be imposed for 
knowing violations of CAA regulations.
87
 Furthermore, under Section 
113(c)(2) of the CAA, criminal liability with a fine and a maximum two-
year prison sentence may be imposed for (1) knowingly making any false 
statement, representation, or certification in a document filed or required 
to be maintained under the CAA; (2) falsifying, tampering with, or 
knowingly rendering inaccurate any monitoring device or method 
required to be maintained; or (3) knowingly failing to make reports that 
are required.
88
 Also, the fines and prison sentences can be doubled in the 
event of a second conviction of any of these offenses.
89
 
ii. The CWA 
Two years after enacting the CAA in 1970, Congress amended the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, commonly called the Clean Water 
Act.
90
 The CWA of 1972 provided misdemeanor penalties of up to one 
year of imprisonment and a $25,000 fine for the willful or negligent 
violation of requirements imposed by or under the CWA,
91
 or of the 
conditions or limitations in a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination 
System (NPDES) permit issued by the EPA Administrator or, a state, or 
in a Section 404 permit.
92
 The same violation was made a felony if 
committed after a first conviction.
93
 The 1972 statute also established 
misdemeanor penalties of up to six months of imprisonment and a 




 42 U.S.C.A §§ 7413(c)(1)(1977) amended by 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413 (1990); see also Adamo 
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 282 (1978). 
 
85
 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1). 
 
86
 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1) (person convicted of violation ―shall, upon conviction, be 
punished by a fine pursuant to Title 18, or by imprisonment for not to exceed 5 years, or both‖). 
 
87
 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1). 
 
88
 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(2). 
 
89
 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1),(2). 
 
90
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
91
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1). 
 
92
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1)(B). 
 
93
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1). 
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monitoring devices required to be maintained under the CWA.
94
 
The CWA was amended in 1987, increasing criminal penalty 
provisions.
95
 A violator may now be liable for misdemeanor penalties of 
up to one year of imprisonment and a $25,000-per-day fine for the 
negligent violation of any of eight specific sections of the statute,
96
 of 
requirements imposed by permits issued under the Section 402 NPDES 
program, or of the Section 404 dredge-and-fill permit program, or for the 
contamination of sewer systems and publicly owned treatment works.
97
 
Further, the amendments distinguished between negligent violations, 
which are punished as misdemeanors, and knowing violations, which are 
punished as felonies.
98
 These increased penalty provisions are essential 
to the enforcement capabilities of the EPA. 
iii. Statutory Inclusion of the RCO Doctrine 
The 1990 Amendments to the CAA also added the ―responsible 
corporate officer‖ provision to the definition of ―person‖ for purposes of 
criminal penalties.
99
 This provision is similar to the CWA addition in the 
1977 Amendments.
100
 With the 1977 enactment and in the 1990 
Amendments to the CAA, Congress failed to explain the addition of the 
RCO provisions.
101
 The only legislative reference concerning the 
addition of the RCO provision in the 1977 amendment to the CAA is 
made in a report from the Senate Committee on Environment and Public 
Works, which states as follows: 
For the purpose of liability for criminal penalties the term ―person‖ is 
defined to include any responsible corporate officer. This is based on a 
similar definition in the enforcement section of the Federal Water 
Pollution Control Act. The Committee intends that criminal penalties 
be sought against those corporate officers under whose responsibility a 




 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(2). 
 
95
 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1972) amended by 33 U.S.C.A § 1319(1987). 
 
96
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1). 
 
97
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(1)(B). 
 
98
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c). 
 
99
 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
100
 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319. 
 
101
 See United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991) (―Section 1319(c)(3) 
does not define a ‗responsible corporate officer‘ and the legislative history is silent regarding 
Congress‘s intention in adding the term. However, the Supreme Court first recognized the concept of 
‗responsible corporate officer‘ in 1943.‖). 
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involved in the operation of the violating source.
102
 
The change intended by these amendments is unclear. Long before 
the addition of the RCO provisions by these amendments, the Supreme 
Court held that a corporate official was in fact a ―person‖ subject to 
liability under the FDCA.
103
 With this in mind, the legislative 
amendments to include RCOs in the definition of ―person‖ would not 
have been necessary to convict corporate officers, indicating Congress 
intended a more significant change when adding ―responsible corporate 
officers‖ as potentially liable parties under the CWA and CAA.
104
 
The CWA and CAA require the government to show that a 
defendant had ―knowledge‖ of the violation to satisfy the mens rea of the 
felony.
105
 However, the RCO doctrine has been used to impose criminal 
liability without regard to the state of mind of the defendant.
106
 The 
Tenth Circuit addressed this discrepancy in the mental state required for 
conviction under the CWA: 
 We interpret the addition of ―responsible corporate officers‖ as an 
expansion of liability under the Act rather than, as defendant would 
have it, an implicit limitation. The plain language of the statute, after 
all, states that ―responsible corporate officers‖ are liable ―in addition 
to the definition [of persons] contained in section 1362(5) . . . .‖
107
 
The logical interpretation of the addition of the RCO provisions to 
these statutes would indicate that by incorporating the doctrine into the 






 Brenda S. Hustis & John Y. Gotanda, The Responsible Corporate Officer: Designated 
Felon or Legal Fiction?, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 169, 183-84 (1994) (quoting S. Rep. No. 94-717, 95th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 40 (1976)). 
 
103
 See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 284 (1943). 
 
104
 Hustis & Gotanda, supra note 102, at 183-84; see also, Joseph J. Lisa, Negligence-Based 
Environmental Crimes: Failing To Exercise Due Care Can Be Criminal, 18 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9 
(2007) (arguing that the RCO doctrine imposes criminal sanctions against corporate officers 
regardless of their participation in violating a public-welfare statute as long as they are in a position 
of power to prevent or correct the violation and failed to do so). 
 
105
 See 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(2) (Westlaw 2010) (allowing for imprisonment for greater than 
one year for knowing violations); & 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(1) (Westlaw 2010) (same); see also 18 
U.S.C.A. 3559(a) (Westlaw 2010) (distinguishing a misdemeanor from felony by the term of 
imprisonment for a felony as one year or greater). 
 
106
 See Hustis & Gotanda, supra note 102, 183; see also United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 
1413, 1419 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 
107
 Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1419 (quoting 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(3)). 
 
108
 See, e.g., United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015, 1023 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying the plain 
meaning of ―responsible‖ as ―answerable‖ or ―involving a degree of accountability,‖ because the 
CWA does not include a definition of ―responsible corporate officer‖). 
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supports the inference that Congress intended to hold corporate officers 
liable who were in a ―responsible position‖ and allow for the imputation 
of knowledge to be based on their ―responsible position.‖ 
The RCO doctrine has also been frequently criticized for its 
potential effect on any required mens rea element. There is a fear that 
utilizing the doctrine will hold corporate officials, as a class of 
defendants, strictly criminally liable and that this will have an unfair and 
discriminatory effect.
109
 This criticism fails to acknowledge that the 
application of the RCO doctrine does not eliminate the need to prove 
culpability altogether. Rather, it is a tool by which the appropriate mens 
rea can be imputed based on other circumstances.
110
 Liability is not 
imposed under the RCO doctrine based solely on the officer‘s title; 
rather, an evaluation must be done of the officer‘s responsibility in 
relation to the criminal violation.
111
 
IV. EARLY CASE APPLICATION OF THE RCO DOCTRINE 
A. UNITED STATES V. FREZZO BROS. 
The first reported case to apply the RCO doctrine to a major federal 
environmental statute was the Third Circuit‘s 1979 decision in United 
States v. Frezzo Bros.
112
 The defendants, Guido and James Frezzo, 
owned and operated a mushroom- farming business, Frezzo Brothers, 
Inc., that was caught discharging pollutants in water of the United States 
without a permit, in violation of the CWA.
113
 The indictment specifically 
stated that the Frezzos were being charged as individuals in their 
capacities as co-owners and corporate officers of Frezzo Brothers, Inc.
114
 
The Frezzos argued on appeal that the district court erred by not 
instructing the jury that the Frezzos were being charged in their capacity 
as corporate owners and officers.
115




 Finn, supra note 63, at 573. 
 
110
 See Joseph E. Cole, Environmental Criminal Liability: What Federal Officials Know (or 
Should Know) Can Hurt Them, 54 A.F. L. REV. 1, 35 (2004) (―[I]n no application of the RCO 
doctrine to an environmental statute has the requirement for proving mens rea been done away with; 
the requirement for knowledge of the underlying acts is still required and can be inferred as a result 
of the corporate officer‘s position and authority.‖). 
 
111
 See United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528, 531 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 
112
 United States v. Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 
113
 Id. at 1125. 
 
114
 United States v. Frezzo Bros., 461 F. Supp 266, 272 (E.D. Pa. 1978), aff’d, 602 F.2d 1123 
(3d Cir. 1979). 
 
115
 Frezzo Bros., 602 F.2d at 1130 n.11. 
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argument summarily, noting that ―[t]he Government argued the case on 
the ‗responsible corporate officer doctrine‘ recognized by the United 
States Supreme Court in United States v. Park and United States v. 
Dotterweich,‖ and that the Court ―perceive[d] no error in the instruction 
to the jury on this theory.‖
116
 This Third Circuit decision supports the 
application of the RCO doctrine to the CWA as it is was applied to the 
FDCA in Park and Dotterweich. 
However, the issue on appeal was not how the criminal liability of 
corporate officers had been defined at trial.
117
 The defendants contended 
that it was improper for the trial court to instruct the jury that they could 
be found guilty as individuals when the government had argued the case 
on the RCO doctrine and the indictment had charged them with acting as 
corporate officials.
118
 The appellate court found no error in the 
instruction to the jury on the ―responsible corporate officer doctrine‖ as 
recognized by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Park
119
 and United States v. Dotterweich
120
 as argued by the 
Government. Because this was not the issue on appeal the Court‘s 
language regarding the correctness of the application of the RCO 
doctrine was dictum. 
B. UNITED STATES V. JOHNSON & TOWERS, INC. 
In 1984 the Third Circuit decided United States v. Johnson & 
Towers, Inc.,
121
 which involved the criminal prosecution of a foreman 
and a mid-level manager for a ―knowing‖ violation of Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitting requirements.
122
 The 
EPA had neither issued a permit nor received an application for a permit 
for Johnson & Towers‘ operations.
123
 However, neither defendant was 




In discussing who may be found guilty under RCRA, the court first 
reiterated the principle expressed in Dotterweich that ―though the result 







 Id. at 1124. 
 
118
 Id. at 1130 n.11. 
 
119
 United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1974). 
 
120
 United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943). 
 
121
 United States v. Johnson & Towers, Inc., 741 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1984). 
 
122
 Id. at 663-64. 
 
123
 Id. at 664. 
 
124
 See id. at 666. 
17
Mullikin: Holding Corporate Officers Responsible
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
05_MULLIKIN PRINTER VERSION 5/22/2010  11:51 AM 
412 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 3 
regulatory statutes intended to protect public health, in contrast to 
statutes based on common-law crimes, are to be construed to effectuate 
the regulatory purpose.‖
125
 The court‘s decision supports the imposition 
of harsh criminal liability based on the officer‘s position, justifying the 
results on the importance of public safety. 
The court addressed the fact that Dotterweich involved a strict 
liability statute
126
 and that Johnson & Towers, Inc. dealt with a statute 
containing a scienter requirement.
127
 The Court suggested that, because 
of the public-welfare nature of RCRA, there might be a ―reasonable basis 
for reading the statute without any mens rea requirement.‖
128
 But the 
court also held that, because of the explicit knowledge requirement and 
the syntax of the statute,
129
 the government would have to prove that the 
defendants knew that Johnson & Towers, Inc., was required to have a 




The CWA and the CAA differ from RCRA in that they actually 
have RCO liability written into them. This opinion appears to restrict the 
imposition of criminal liability because the statute requires knowledge. It 
is arguable that this opinion is not applicable to violations of the CAA or 
CWA because this court was dealing with RCRA, which does not have 
the RCO doctrine written into it.
131
 Further, the court indicated that a 
reasonable basis existed for imposing crminal liability solely on the basis 
of a corporate officer‘s position, but that it could not in this case due to 
the wording of the statute.
132
 
V. CONTEMPORANEOUS COURT OPINIONS 
There were three different cases decided in 1991 involving the RCO 
doctrine. United States v. Brittain
133
 spoke to the expansion of criminal 
liability under the RCO doctrine. On the other hand, both United States 
v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.
134









 See 21 U.S.C.A. §§ 301-392 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
127
 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928(d) (Westlaw 2010). 
 
128
 Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668. 
 
129
 See id. 
 
130
 Id. at 670. 
 
131
 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
132
 See Johnson & Towers, 741 F.2d at 668. 
 
133
 United States v. Brittain, 931 F.2d 1413 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 
134
 United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 
135
 United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991). 
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went in the opposite direction, placing a limitation on the application of 
the doctrine. 
A. UNITED STATES V. BRITTAIN 
In United States v. Brittain,
136
 the defendant was charged with two 
misdemeanor counts under the CWA for unlawful discharges into 
navigable waters.
137
 The CWA expressly includes RCOs in its definition 
of persons who can be convicted under the Act.
138
 Brittain was the public 
utilities director for the city of Enid, Oklahoma, and ―had general 
supervisory authority over the operation of the [city‘s] wastewater 
treatment plant.‖
139
 The evidence showed that Brittain was advised that 
pollutants were being discharged into a local creek in violation of the 
city‘s permit.
140
 Brittain had observed the discharges but instructed the 
plant supervisor not to report them to the EPA, even though it was 
required by the permit.
141
 
Brittain raised a statutory-construction argument on appeal that 
addressed the CWA‘s definition of the terms ―individual‖ and 
―responsible corporate officer.‖
142
 Brittain contended that there was no 
evidence that he individually caused the unlawful discharge, and the only 
proof of his involvement with the discharge was his relationship to the 
discharging entity, Enid.
143
 Therefore, he argued, he could not be 
convicted as an ―individual‖ under the Act. Brittain argued that for 
criminal liability to attach to an individual who is related to the 
discharging entity but is not the actual discharger, the government must 
establish that the individual was an RCO.
144
 
The court rejected this argument, holding that the inclusion of the 
term ―responsible corporate officer‖ in the CWA did not narrow the 
range of individuals subject to criminal liability.
145
 The court discussed 
the origin of the term in Dotterweich and Park, likening the purposes of 




 931 F.2d 1413. 
 
137
 Id. at 1414 (10th Cir. 1991) (Brittain was also charged with making false statements under 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (1988)); see also 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
138
 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(6) (Westlaw 2010) (definition of ―person‖). 
 
139
 Brittain, 931 F.2d at 1415. 
 
140
 Id. at 1418. 
 
141
 See id. at 1420. 
 
142
 See id. at 1419. 
 
143
 See id. at 1420. 
 
144





Mullikin: Holding Corporate Officers Responsible
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
05_MULLIKIN PRINTER VERSION 5/22/2010  11:51 AM 
414 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 3 
the public health interest to outweigh the hardship suffered by criminally 
liable responsible corporate officers who had no consciousness of wrong-
doing.‖
146
 Concluding that the same public health rationale applies to the 
CWA, the court went on to state: 
We think that Congress perceived this objective [to restore and 
maintain the integrity of the nation‘s waters] to outweigh hardships 
suffered by ―responsible corporate officers‖ who are held criminally 
liable in spite of their lack of ―consciousness of wrong-doing.‖ We 
interpret the addition of ―responsible corporate officers‖ as an 
expansion of liability under the Act. . . Under this interpretation a 
―responsible corporate officer,‖ to be held criminally liable, would not 
have to ―willfully or negligently‖ cause a permit violation. Instead, the 
willfulness or negligence of the actor would be imputed to him by 
virtue of his position of responsibility.
147
 
Unfortunately, the defendant‘s criminal intent was not an issue on 
appeal.
148
 For this reason, the court‘s language regarding imposing 
criminal liability on RCOs has been dismissed as dictum.
149
 
Nevertheless, it does indicate how the court would decide the issue if it 
were to come before it. 
B. UNITED STATES V. MACDONALD & WATSON 
The First Circuit chose to limit criminal liability in United States v. 
MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.
150
 The First Circuit overturned the 
felony conviction of the company president, ruling that the trial court‘s 
jury instructions improperly suggested that the president could be 
convicted of a knowing RCRA violation based upon his position as an 
RCO and without actual proof of actual knowledge.
151
 The jury had been 
instructed that knowledge could be proven either by a showing of actual 
knowledge or by a showing that the defendant was an RCO.
152
 The trial 
court stated that a defendant is an RCO if the defendant (1) was a 
corporate officer, (2) had the responsibility to supervise the allegedly 










 See id. at 1413. 
 
149
 See Finn, supra note 63, at 565-66 (―On close analysis, it is clear that the Tenth Circuit‘s 
―expansive language in Brittain‖ is ―unwarranted dicta.‖). 
 
150
 United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 
151
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The First Circuit ruled that this test was inconsistent with the 
express mens rea requirement in RCRA.
154
 The First Circuit agreed that 
knowledge may be inferred from willful blindness or circumstantial 
evidence, including a defendant‘s position, responsibility, conduct, and 
information provided to the defendant on prior occasions.
155
 However, 
the court held that it was improper to allow a conclusive presumption of 
knowledge based on such evidence when the crime expressly requires 
proof of knowledge as an element.
156
 Accordingly, the court concluded 
that ―[i]n a crime having knowledge as an express element, a mere 
showing of official responsibility under Dotterweich and Park is not an 
adequate substitute for direct or circumstantial proof of knowledge.‖
157
 
Again it should be noted that the CWA and the CAA differ from 
RCRA in that they actually have RCO liability written into them. It is 
arguable that this opinion is inapplicable to CAA or CWA violations 
because this court was dealing with RCRA, which does not have the 
RCO doctrine written into it.
158
 
C. UNITED STATES V. WHITE 
The same limitation is further supported under RCRA violations by 
the decision in United States v. White,
159
 in which the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Washington clearly rejected the 
proposition that a corporate officer may be held criminally liable for 
RCRA violations based solely on the officer‘s responsible position.
160
 In 
White, the prosecution relied on Park and Dotterweich to argue that the 
company‘s environmental safety officer could be held liable for knowing 
criminal violations of RCRA simply by virtue of his position of 
responsibility and authority.
161
 The court disagreed, holding that those 
cases were inapplicable because they involved strict-liability crimes, 
whereas the criminal provision of RCRA contains a mens rea element of 
knowledge.
162




 Id. at 50, 52 n.15. 
 
154
 Id. at 53. 
 
155
 Id. at 52, 54. 
 
156
 Id. at 52. 
 
157
 Id. at 55. 
 
158
 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 6928 (Westlaw 2010). 
 
159
 United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991). 
 
160
 See id. at 895. 
 
161
 Id. at 894. 
 
162
 Id. at 894-95. 
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crimes where the applicable statute requires proof of knowledge as an 
element of the crime.
163
 The court concluded that to secure a conviction, 
the government must prove that the defendant had actual knowledge of 
the violations, rather than merely showing that the defendant should have 
known of the violations.
164
 
VI. CONFIRMATIONS OF RCO-DOCTRINE LIMITATIONS 
Although the limitations set forth on the RCO doctrine set forth in 
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.
165
 and United 
States v. White
166
 were in the context of RCRA, the reasoning was 
extended to apply under the CWA and the CAA in later cases. 
A. UNITED STATES V. IVERSON 
In United States v. Iverson,
167
 the Ninth Circuit affirmed a limited 
application of the RCO doctrine to Thomas Iverson, the president of a 
company who both encouraged and allowed his employees to discharge 
water containing chemical residue into the sewer.
168
 The district court‘s 
jury instruction on the RCO doctrine required that to convict, the jury 
had to find that (1) the defendant had knowledge of the fact that 
pollutants were being discharged to the sewer system by employees of 
the company, (2) the defendant had the authority and capacity to prevent 
the discharge of pollutants to the sewer system, and (3) the defendant 
failed to prevent the on-going discharge of pollutants into the sewer 
system.
169
 On appeal, Iverson argued that these instructions erroneously 
allowed the jury to find him guilty of CWA violations without finding 
that he was actually in control of the activity that caused the discharge, or 
that he had an express corporate duty to oversee the activity, and without 
finding that the discharges violated the CWA.
170
 The Ninth Circuit 












 United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 
166
 United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991). 
 
167
 United States v. Iverson, 162 F.3d 1015 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 
168
 Id. at 1018-19. 
 
169
 Id. at 1022. 
 
170
 Id. (holding that a ―responsible corporate officer‖ did not have to participate or control her 
employees‘ actions to be held liable, but that liability hinged only on ―authority to exercise control‖ 
over the activity in question). But see U.S. v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 70-72 (1998) (holding that an 
―operator‖ must participate in and control its subsidiaries‘ activities to be liable). 
 
171
 See Iverson, 162 F.3d at 1026. 
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However, the court noted that the doctrine ―relieve[s] the government 
only of having to prove that defendant personally discharged or caused 
the discharge of a pollutant. The government still had to prove that the 
discharges violated the law and that defendant knew that the discharges 
were pollutants.‖
172
 This affirms the limitations that were set forth in 
United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co.
173
 and United 
States v. White.
174
 The courts chose to restrict criminal liability by 
requiring actual knowledge in the CWA context instead of allowing for 
the use of the RCO doctrine to close the gap between the reality of 
corporate officers‘ knowledge of the violation and the difficulty in 
proving that knowledge. 
B. UNITED STATES V. MING HONG 
United States v. Ming Hong
175
 was a CWA prosecution for permit 
violations. James Ming Hong was the owner of Avion Environmental 
Groups, a wastewater treatment facility in Richmond, Virginia.
176
 Hong 
was charged with negligently violating pretreatment requirements ―as a 
responsible corporate officer.‖
177
 Hong argued that he could not be 
prosecuted as a responsible corporate an RCO because he was not a 
formally designated corporate officer of Avion and, alternatively, that he 
did not exert sufficient control over Avion‘s operations to be held 
responsible for the discharges from Avion‘s facility.
178
 The Fourth 
Circuit rejected both arguments.
179
 It began by reviewing Dotterweich, 
which it summarized as ―holding that all who had ‗a responsible share‘ in 
the criminal conduct could be held accountable for corporate violations 
of the law.‖
180
 The court also noted that Park ―elaborat[ed] on the 
concept of a ‗responsible share,‘‖ holding that a defendant may be held 
criminally responsible for a violation he did not directly commit if ―the 
defendant had, by reason of his position in the corporation, responsibility 
and authority either to prevent in the first instance, or promptly to 









 United States v. MacDonald & Watson Waste Oil Co., 933 F.2d 35 (1st Cir. 1991). 
 
174
 United States v. White, 766 F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Wash. 1991). 
 
175
 United States v. Ming Hong, 242 F.3d 528 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 
176
 Id. at 529-30. 
 
177






 Id. at 529. 
 
180
 Id. at 531. 
 
181
 Id. (quoting United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1975)); see also Lisa, supra note 
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court described the criminal liability to be applied under the RCO 
doctrine as: 
The gravamen of liability as a responsible corporate officer is not 
one‘s corporate title or lack thereof; rather, the pertinent question is 
whether the defendant bore such a relationship to the corporation that 
it is appropriate to hold him criminally liable for failing to prevent the 
charged violations of the CWA.
182
 
This reasoning appears to leave the door open to an extension of 
liability based on corporate position. Unfortunately, this application of 
the RCO doctrine is limited, because James Ming Hong was held 
criminally liable under CWA § 309(c)(1)(A) for negligent discharges by 
his company, not for knowing violations.
183
 
C. UNITED STATES V. HANSEN 
In United States v. Hansen,
184
 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
convictions of three individuals convicted of conspiracy and violating the 
CWA, RCRA, and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA). The district court used an 
RCO instruction requiring that, to convict, the jury had to find that the 
defendants ―acted knowingly in failing to prevent, detect or correct the 
violation.‖
185
 The defendants argued that the instruction allowed the jury 
to find them guilty based on constructive, rather than actual, 
knowledge.
186
 The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument, holding that 
the requirement that the defendants must have ―acted knowingly‖ made it 
sufficiently clear that the jury could not find the defendants guilty under 
the RCO doctrine without finding that they had actual knowledge of the 
violations.
187
 This holding again reaffirmed the mens rea limitation set by 
previous courts. 
 
104, at 9. 
 
182
 Ming Hong, 242 F.3d at 531. 
 
183
 Id. at 532. 
 
184
 United States v. Hansen, 262 F.3d 1217 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 
185






 Id. at 1253. 
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VII. JUSTIFICATION FOR EXPANDING LIABILITY 
A. THE NEED FOR THE EXPANSION OF LIABILITY 
The RCO doctrine is a necessary tool to close the gap between the 
reality of corporate officer involvement in the violation of environmental 
crimes and prosecutors‘ ability to convict corporate officers for their 
involvement.
188
 A corporation may be convicted for crimes of its agents 
who violate the law while acting on its behalf and in the scope of their 
employment,
189
 but a corporate officer is generally not criminally liable 
unless he or she personally participates in or authorizes the criminal 
act.
190
 Generally, an officer cannot be convicted for acts performed by 
other employees unless it is proven that the actions were done under the 
officer‘s direction or with his or her permission.
191
 This is what makes 




 See John Monroe, Applying the Responsible Corporate Officer and Conscious Avoidance 
Doctrines in the Context of the Abu Ghraib Prison Scandal, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1367, 1383 (2006) 
(arguing that the RCO doctrine and the conscious-avoidance doctrines provide an analytical 
framework for the prosecution of parties who are not directly involved in a criminal act); see also 
WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS 255 
(6th ed. 1998). 
 
189
 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494-95 (1909) (in 
considering the criminal responsibility of a corporation for an act done while an authorized agent of 
the company was exercising the authority conferred upon him, the Court found that in applying the 
principle governing civil liability, ―we go only a step farther in holding that the act of the agent, 
while exercising the authority delegated to him to make rates for transportation, may be controlled, 
in the interest of public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the 
corporation for which he is acting in the premises‖). 
 
190
 See 1 CHARLES E. TORCIA, WHARTON‘S CRIMINAL LAW § 29, at 181 (15th ed. 1993) (―In 
connection with the principal in the second degree or accessory before the fact, the terms ‗aid‘ and 
‗abet‘ are frequently used interchangeably, although they are not synonymous. To ‗aid‘ is to assist or 
help another. To ‗abet‘ means, literally, to bait or excite, as in the case of an animal. In its legal 
sense, it means to encourage, advise, or instigate the commission of a crime.‖). 
 
191
 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility for the Acts of Another, 43 HARV. L. 
REV. 689, 702-08 (1930) (concluding that courts hold a principal criminally liable for acts that he or 
she ―causes‖ his or her agent to perform, either by express encouragement or knowing 
acquiescence); see also 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE 
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1349 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 1999); see, e.g., United States v. 
Aarons, 718 F.2d 188, 190-93 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting aiding and abetting liability of corporate 
officer who knew that others were making false statements to a government agency, because the 
officer did not affirmatively encourage the making of those statements); United States v. Berger, 456 
F.2d 1349, 1352 (2d Cir. 1972) (affirming aiding and abetting liability of president and chief 
executive officer whose ―willful affirmative acts‖ included directing a bookkeeper to remove 
invoices of a foreign subsidiary as part of a tax-evasion scheme); United States v. Laffal, 83 A.2d 
871, 872 (D.C. 1951) (noting that the general rule requires that officers must personally authorize a 
criminal act to be held liable). 
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of environmental crimes; it can bridge the gap between the current law 




It is important to note that the RCO doctrine is a common-law 
theory of imposing liability that is separate and distinct from piercing the 
corporate veil or personal liability for direct participation in tortious 
conduct.
193
 Unlike when liability is based on piercing the corporate veil, 
liability as an RCO does not depend on a finding of that the corporation 
is inadequately capitalized, that the corporate form is being used to 
perpetrate a fraud, or that corporate formalities have not been honored.
194
 
The RCO doctrine requires a finding of three essential elements in order 
to convict a corporate officer: 
(1) [T]he individual must be in a position of responsibility which 
allows the person to influence corporate policies or activities; (2) there 
must be a nexus between the individual‘s position and the violation in 
question such that the individual could have influenced the corporate 
actions which constituted the violations; and (3) the individual‘s 
actions or inactions facilitated the violations.
195
 
These requirements prevent arbitrary imposition of criminal liability 
based only on corporate title.
196
 
Use of the RCO doctrine to infer knowledge in the context of 
corporate environmental crimes is necessary to convict those officers 




 See Todd W. Grant, The Responsible Relationship Doctrine of United States v. Park: A 
Tool for Prosecution of Corporate Officers Under Federal and State Environmental Laws, 11 TEMP. 
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 203, 204 (1992) (discussing the difficulty in obtaining a conviction based on 
circumstantial evidence when there is only indirect evidence of a corporate officer‘s guilt from the 




 See Noel Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the 
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement Cases, 21 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 288 (2002) (noting that the doctrine does not require the government to 
pierce the corporate veil); see also Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 881 A.2d 937, 963-64 
(Conn. 2005); BEC Corp. v. Dep‘t of Envtl. Prot., 775 A.2d 928, 938 (Conn. 2001). 
 
194
 See, e.g., Kilduff v. Adams, Inc., 593 A.2d 478, 487-88 (1991) (―[W]e conclude that it was 
unnecessary to pierce the corporate veil in order to find that the [corporate officers] were personally 
liable for their misrepresentations.‖); 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER 
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1135 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2009); 18 AM. 
JUR. 2D Corporations § 54 (2009). 
 
195
 In re Dougherty, 482 N.W.2d 485, 490 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (citing United States v. 
Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674 (1975), and United States v. Dotterwich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943)); see also 
Comm‘r Ind. Dep‘t of Envtl. Mgmt v. RLG, Inc.. 755 N.E.2d 556, 561 (Ind. 2001). 
 
196
 See United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 674 (1975). 
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corporate officer actually authorized the criminal act of a lower-level 
employee, because authorization of that sort is rarely documented.
197
 
Higher-up corporate officers in positions of control can easily create the 
impression that they do not know the details of lower-level employees‘ 
illegal activity.
198
 In fact, because many statutes explicitly require proof 




B. INFERRING CRIMINAL KNOWLEDGE WITH THE RCO DOCTRINE 
Application of the RCO doctrine to expand criminal liability would 
be consistent with congressional intent because Congress specifically left 
the definition of ―knowingly‖ to the courts.
200
 By not providing any 
definition, Congress gave the courts authorization to consider doctrinal 
interpretations, such as the RCO doctrine, in their analysis.
201
 By not 
defining ―knowingly,‖ Congress left the definition open to be interpreted 
according to modern jurisprudence. For example, the jury instruction 
regarding the term ―knowingly‖ varies from circuit to circuit. The Fifth 
Circuit‘s pattern instruction states that ―knowingly . . . means that the act 
was done voluntarily and intentionally, not because of mistake or 
accident.‖
202
 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit defines ―knowing‖ in this way: 
An act is done knowingly if the defendant is aware of the act and does 
not act (or fail to act) through ignorance, mistake or accident. The 
government is not required to prove that the defendant knew that 




 See RONALD R. SIMS & MARGARET P. SPENCER, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE 
MISCONDUCT: AN OVERVIEW AND DISCUSSION, IN CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: THE LEGAL, 
SOCIETAL AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES 1, 11-12 (Ronald R. Sims & Margaret P. Spencer eds., 1995) 
(noting that senior officers can easily disguise misconduct in a large organization, as in one case in 
which officers instituted compliance policies in order to conceal their approval of misconduct). 
 
198
 See, e.g., United States v. TIC Inv. Corp., 68 F.3d 1082, 1089 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that 
an officer who exercises complete control over corporate operations may avoid confronting the 
details of illegal toxic waste disposal, making it difficult to impose liability). 
 
199
 See, e.g., People v. Byrne, 570 N.E.2d 1066, 1068-69 (N.Y. 1991) (construing N.Y. Penal 
Law to limit individual liability for corporate criminal acts to defendants who caused to be 
performed or personally performed illegal conduct). 
 
200
 See United States v. Hayes Int‘l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1502 (11th Cir. 1986) (―Congress 
did not provide any guidance, either in the statute or the legislative history, concerning the meaning 
of ‗knowing‘ in section 6928(d).‖). 
 
201
 Heep, supra note 8 at 723 (arguing that continued application of the RCO doctrine is 
consistent with congressional intent because Congress specifically left the definition of ―knowingly‖ 
to the courts). 
 
202
 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS, PATTERN CRIM. JURY INSTR. 1ST CIR. 2.13 
(1998). 
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evidence of the defendant‘s words, acts, or omissions, along with all 




On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit provides no pattern instruction 
because it has determined that ―the meaning of the term ‗knowingly‘ 
varies depending on the particular statute in which it appears.‖
204
 The 
Eighth Circuit provides no model instruction, because ―in most cases the 
word ‗knowingly‘ does not need to be defined.‖
205
 The courts would 
clearly be acting within appropriate boundaries by allowing the 
―knowledge‖ requirement to be met inferentially in environmental crimes 
through the RCO doctrine. 
The inference of knowledge has been applied under several 
different legal doctrines. Knowledge has been found in situations where 
only circumstantial evidence was provided.
206
 This can also be seen in 
other legal doctrines such as respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, 
which allows proof of a defendant‘s criminal knowledge to be substituted 
by proof of someone else‘s knowledge.
207
 The courts have also imposed 
liability under the doctrines of willful blindness or conscious avoidance 
of the truth.
208
 This allows for the inference of knowledge based on what 
the defendant would have known through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence.
209
 Lastly, an argument can be made for the imposition of 














 FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS, MODEL CRIM. JURY INSTR. 8TH CIR. 7.03 
(2007) (citing United States v. Smith, 635 F.2d 716, 719-20 (8th Cir. 1980)). 
 
206
 See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int‘l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499, 1504 (11th Cir. 1986) (―[T]he 
government may prove guilty knowledge with circumstantial evidence.‖)  In the Hayes case, the 
statute at issue established certain procedures that, when not followed, permitted a jury to infer 
certain wrongdoing.  Id. 
 
207
 See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, respondeat superior (8th ed. 2004) (―The doctrine holding 
an employer or principal liable for the employee‘s or agent‘s wrongful acts committed within the 
scope of the employment or agency.‖). 
 
208
 See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY, willful blindness (8th ed. 2004) (―Deliberate avoidance of 
knowledge of a crime, esp. by failing to make a reasonable inquiry about suspected wrongdoing 
despite being aware that it is highly probable. A person acts with willful blindness, for example, by 
deliberately refusing to look inside an unmarked package after being paid by a known drug dealer to 
deliver it. Willful blindness creates an inference of knowledge of the crime in question.‖). 
 
209
 See BLACK‘S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004), willful blindness (8th ed. 2004). 
 
210
 See, e.g., REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 official cmt. (1983) (setting forth the 
standards of conduct for directors by focusing on the manner in which directors perform their 
duties). 
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Based on all these well-settled theories of law, it is not outside the 
courts‘ authority to expand liability by use of the RCO doctrine. 
i. Circumstantial Proof of Knowledge 
The use of circumstantial evidence to prove knowledge is seen in 
United States v. Hayes International Corp.
211
 The defendants in this case, 
a corporation and one of its employees, were charged with knowingly 
transporting hazardous waste to an unpermitted facility.
212
 The 
government proved, through a series of circumstances, the defendants‘ 
knowledge that the facility to which they had shipped certain paint waste 
was not recycling the waste.
213
 The court pointed out that the government 
presented no direct proof of the employee‘s knowledge that paint waste 
was not being recycled, but that it successfully proved such knowledge 
through the series of circumstances.
214
 
Congressional intent to allow the use of circumstantial evidence to 
impose criminal liability upon persons can be seen in the enforcement 
provisions of both the CWA and CAA. They both explicitly provide that 
knowledge may be established by the use of circumstantial evidence.
215
 
Again, this indicates that the inference of knowledge via circumstantial 
evidence under the RCO doctrine would not stray from congressional 
intent. 
ii. Other Ways To Prove “Knowledge” 
Along the same lines as circumstantial proof of knowledge, other 
criminal-law doctrines have been used to prove knowledge in 
environmental jurisprudence.
216




 United States v. Hayes Int‘l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 
212
 See id. at 1501. 
 
213
 See id. at 1506. The evidence revealed that the employee knew the recycler derived no 
economic benefit from accepting the paint waste, and that the employee failed to follow internal 
corporate procedures requiring disposal of wastes lacking resale value only to sites approved by the 
EPA. Additionally, conversations between the employee and the recycler indicated that the 
employee knew that the paint wastes were not being recycled. Id. 
 
214
 See id.; see also supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text. 
 
215
 See CWA, 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319(c)(3)(B)(i) (Westlaw 2010) (providing that ―in proving the 
defendant‘s possession of actual knowledge [under the knowing endangerment provision] 
circumstantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to 
shield himself from relevant information‖); see also CAA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(c)(5)(B) (Westlaw 
2010) (noting providing that ―in proving a defendant‘s possession of actual knowledge, 
circumstantial evidence may be used, including evidence that the defendant took affirmative steps to 
be shielded from relevant information.‖). 
 
216
 See, e.g., United States v. Bank of New England, N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 847 (1st Cir. 1987) 
29
Mullikin: Holding Corporate Officers Responsible
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2001
05_MULLIKIN PRINTER VERSION 5/22/2010  11:51 AM 
424 GOLDEN GATE UNIV. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW J. [Vol. 3 
knowledge to be based on proof of something other than actual 
knowledge.
217
 Respondeat superior, or vicarious liability, is essential in 
the area of corporate prosecutions because the doctrine allows proof of 
the defendant‘s criminal knowledge to be made by proof of someone 
else‘s knowledge.
218
 At the turn of the century, the Supreme Court 
extended the respondeat superior doctrine ―a step farther‖ to include its 
applicability in the criminal context.
219
 ―The rationale for extending 
principles of respondeat superior to criminal prosecutions is grounded in 
the belief that a broad standard is needed . . . to combat the 
organizational roots of white collar crime.‖
220
 
The doctrine of willful blindness, or and conscious avoidance of the 
truth, has been used to prove criminal knowledge as well.
221
 The doctrine 
is based on the theory that ―deliberate ignorance and positive knowledge 
are equally culpable.‖
222
 The theory encompasses the idea that a person 
―knows of facts of which he is less than absolutely certain‖ when that 
person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such facts.
223
 
The doctrine allows the trier of fact to infer guilty knowledge, such as in 
United States v. Hayes International Corp.,
224
 where the court stated that 
a defendant acts ―knowingly‖ under RCRA, even if the defendant only 
willfully fails to determine the permit status of a facility where hazardous 
 
(upholding the conviction of a bank over violations of the Currency Transaction Reporting Act based 
on a ―pattern of illegal activity,‖ which established an illicit ―scheme.‖). 
 
217
 See id. 
 
218
 See United States v. Marathon Dev. Corp., 867 F.2d 96, 97 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding 
corporate defendant criminally liable for actions of its senior vice-president, who had caused a 
protected federal wetlands to be dredged and filled without a permit); see also Joseph G. Block & 
Nancy A. Voisin, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine—Can You Go to Jail for What You 
Don’t Know?, 22 ENVTL. L. 1347, 1366-67 (1992) (arguing that substitutional doctrines, such as 
willful blindness and respondeat superior, create the danger that the requisite knowledge requirement 
will be read out of the environmental statutes). 
 
219
 See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 494 (1909) 
(―Applying the principle governing civil liability, we go only a step farther in holding that the act of 
the agent, while exercising the authority delegated to him . . . may be controlled, in the interest of 
public policy, by imputing his act to his employer and imposing penalties upon the corporation for 
which he is acting in the premises.‖); see also United States v. Nearing, 252 F. 223, 231 (S.D. N.Y. 
1918) (Learned Hand, J.) (―[T]there is no distinction in essence between the civil and the criminal 
liability of corporations, based upon the element of intent or wrongful purpose. Each is merely an 
imputation to the corporation of the mental condition of its agents.‖). 
 
220
 Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal 
Liability: A Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1573 (1990). 
 
221
 Stefan A. Noe, “Willful Blindness”: A Better Doctrine for Holding Corporate Officers 
Criminally Responsible for RCRA Violations, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1461, 1469 (1993). 
 
222
 Id. (quoting United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 
223
 Id. (quoting United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 700 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 
224
 United States v. Hayes Int‘l Corp., 786 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir. 1986). 
30
Golden Gate University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 3, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/gguelj/vol3/iss2/5
05_MULLIKIN PRINTER VERSION 5/22/2010  11:51 AM 
2010] HOLDING CORPORATE OFFICERS RESPONSIBLE 425 
waste is being shipped.
225
 
iii. An Affirmative Duty To Act 
In some situations, the courts have permitted criminal knowledge to 
be established based on what the defendant would have known through 
the exercise of reasonable diligence. Generally, this is applied if the 
defendant has some affirmative duty to know the facts or to investigate 
the situation.
226
 This theory could be used to support imposing liability 
under the RCO doctrine based on the affirmative duty that an officer 
owes to his or her company. 
A corporate officer has a fiduciary duty to the company that 
includes the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.
227
 The duty of care can 
be used to impose liability because it establishes standards by which an 
officer is expected to act.
228
 The duty of care requires officers to maintain 
adequate oversight of corporate operations and to obtain adequate and 
reliable information before making decisions.
229
 This duty requires an 
officer to take an active role in monitoring the corporation‘s activities.
230
 
Additionally, the courts have found that officers are under a continuing 




 See id. at 1504 (―[I]n this regulatory context a defendant acts knowingly if he willfully 
fails to determine the permit status of the facility.‖ (citing Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 
U.S. 337 (1952)). 
 
226
 See, e.g., United States v. Dee, 912 F.2d 741, 745 (4th Cir. 1990) (allowing inference of 
criminal knowledge based on the defendant‘s failure to exercise reasonable diligence). The 
defendants in Dee were civilian engineers involved in the development of chemical warfare systems 
at the Chemical Research, Development, and Engineering Center at Aberdeen Proving Ground in 
Maryland. Id. at 743. They were convicted of illegally storing, treating, and disposing of hazardous 
wastes and appealed the convictions on several grounds. Id. The court found that knowledge could 
be inferred with respect to one of the defendants from evidence that he was informed by safety 
inspectors and employees of problems with the stored chemicals. Id. at 745. The defendant did not 
respond but merely told the staff to ―clean it up as best they could.‖ Id. The court also found that 
knowledge could be inferred from evidence that the defendant was in charge of operations at the 
plant, had previously taken action with respect to the storage of the chemicals, repeatedly ignored 
warnings, and took no actions to comply with the RCRA. Id. 
 
227
 See REV. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.30 official cmt. (1983). 
 
228
 See id. (setting forth the standards of conduct for officers by focusing on the manner in 
which officers perform their duties); see also Lyman P.Q. Johnson, Recalling Why Corporate 




 See Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 822-24 (N.J. 1981) (stating that a 
corporate officer should acquire at least a basic understanding of business of corporation and 
accordingly and that officers are bound to exercise ordinary care so they cannot set up as a defense 
lack of knowledge needed to exercise the requisite degree of care). 
 
230
 See id. (listing several steps that a reasonably prudent officer should take in order to 
maintain proper oversight over a corporation‘s affairs). 
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are bound to exercise ordinary care.
231
 
As discussed above, a corporate officer is subject to criminal 
liability if he or she actively participated in or directed illegal conduct.
232
 
It can be argued that an officer who violates his or her duty of oversight 
by allowing the corporation to break the law should also be held liable, 
even if the officer was not the person who actually participated.
233
 In the 
corporate structure, as discussed above, the corporate officer has a duty 
of oversight.
234
 Logically, the omission or failure to comply with this 
duty of oversight could lead to criminal liability as well. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Protection of the environment is essential to our continued 
existence. Based on modern corporations‘ size and ability to impact the 
environment, it is in the corporate context that the prosecution of 
environmental crimes is so important. The courts should expand criminal 
liability based on the RCO doctrine instead of limiting its application. 
Prevention is the key to the effectiveness of environmental laws, and this 
would best be met by the application of the RCO doctrine to expand 
criminal liability. As the need for environmental awareness becomes 
greater every day, we have to pay attention to the impact we are having 
on the environment. As time passes we are slowly losing our opportunity 
to prevent further deterioration. This is why it is essential to extend 
criminal sanctions to corporate officers, the actual actors, instead of 
stopping at the front door of the corporation. 





 See id. (―Directorial management does not require a detailed inspection of day-to-day 
activities, but rather a general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies. Accordingly, a director is 
well advised to attend board meetings regularly.‖). 
 
232
 See 19 C.J.S. Corporations § 649 (June 2009). (―A corporate official or agent is personally 
liable for all criminal acts in which he or she participates, regardless of whether he or she is acting 
on his or her own behalf or on behalf of the corporation.‖). 
 
233
 See Note, Fiduciary Duties: Expanding the Use of the RCO Doctrine to Statutes with a 
Scienter Requirement, 9 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 235, 248 (2001) (arguing that extending strict 
liability to corporate directors and officers in the area of environmental statutes is appropriate based 
on directors‘ and officers‘ duty to the corporation). 
 
234
 See United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d at 822 (discussing duties of a director, including 
―general monitoring of corporate affairs and policies,‖ regular attendance at board meetings, and 
―familiarity with corporation‘s financial status‖). 
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